



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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CRIMINTSUM 018-02

03 May 2002

CIOP-ACE (195)

260001R April – 022400R May 2002

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A. CURRENT ADVISORIES / BULLETINS

1. Current FBI Terrorist Threat Advisories (TTAs) / Bulletins.
 - a. FBI TTA (Call for Continued Vigilance), 021203Z Jan 02.
 - b. FBI TTA (State & Municipal Web Sites Used to Obtain Information on Infrastructure Facilities), 161927Z Jan 02.
 - c. FBI TTA (Terrorist Threat Advisory Extension), 12 Mar 02.
 - d. FBI Bulletin #10, 1 May 02 (For a complete copy see your local CID office).

2. The DoD threat level for CONUS is **SIGNIFICANT**. The **SIGNIFICANT** threat level is defined as follows: An anti-US terrorist group is operationally active and uses large casualty-producing attacks. There is a substantial DoD presence, and the operational environment is neutral.

The Baseline Force Protection Condition as of 3 May 02 is:

CONUS	Bravo (MDW remains at Charlie)
EUCOM	Bravo
JFCOM	Alpha
PACOM	Alpha
SOUTHCOM	Bravo
CENTCOM	Charlie

3. Transnational terrorists have demonstrated the capability and intent to conduct attacks in the US and against US citizens, facilities and interests worldwide. The FBI possesses no specific information regarding any particular threat; however, the potential for additional attacks remains high in response to the continued US actions in Afghanistan. Law enforcement and security forces need to remain vigilant for the precursors of an attack.

4. The Council on Foreign Relations has launched an online encyclopedia of terrorism and the US response to the September 11 attacks to give the public an easy-to-read, authoritative primer on what the experts know and don't know. The site (www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2002/cfr/) includes a look at state sponsors of terrorism, terrorist groups, the proposed US military tribunals and other aspects of terrorism (CNN).

5. The various CINC combatant and geographical commands, DoD agencies, some Major Army Commands (MACOMs) and the various DoD intelligence agencies produce classified threat advisories and assessments that are available on those elements' classified web sites. Law enforcement and security personnel are encouraged to review those sites for valuable intelligence.

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6.

Homeland Security Advisory System	YELLOW - ELEVATED AS OF 3 May 02
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B. OVERALL TRENDS

1. There are no apparent overall terrorist related trends to report for this period. The theft of identity related items that might facilitate a terrorist intrusion onto an Army installation, facility, or activity remains a matter of concern. Identity related items include uniforms, official badges, military identification cards, government vehicle license plates, and DoD vehicle decals/stickers.

C. TERRORISM / EXTREMISM ACTIVITIES

1. BOLO (BE ON THE LOOKOUT) ALERTS:

a. Late Breaking Domestic Terrorism: Five people were wounded Friday (3 May) when pipe bombs placed in rural mailboxes along the northern border region of Illinois and Iowa exploded. US Postal Service (USPS) advised that it appeared the devices were intended to

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detonate when they were removed from the rural mailboxes. The eight pipe bombs (six apparently detonated) were made from three-quarter inch pipes with a 9-volt battery attached. Each bomb was accompanied by a plastic bag containing a letter filled with anti-government statements and threats of more bombs. The bombs appeared to be set to explode when moved. The bombs did not go through the US mail, but appeared to have been placed in mailboxes at random. The FBI stated they were viewing the incidents as domestic terrorism. No threats were phoned in about the devices. The FBI, ATF and USPS have formed a joint task force to investigate the cases. USPS said all carrier and postal customers in the area would be very cautious when opening mailboxes, and should take special care if wires, a pipe or a letter in a clear plastic bag are found. Found devices should not be touched nor should the mailbox doors be slammed shut. Customers who find suspicious items or notice someone putting things in mailboxes are urged to call their local police or the US Postal Inspection Service command center in St Louis at (314) 539-9310 and immediately clear the area around the mailbox (CNN News).

b. On 23 Apr 02, the FBI released a warning to law enforcement officials that terrorists may be planning attacks against US supermarkets or shopping centers. The warning is based on information obtained from Abu ZUBAIDA, a senior al-Qaida official now in US custody. The information is unsubstantiated, and the warning did not include specific information about possible targets, timing, and numbers of people involved, or any particular method of attack. (Washington AP, 25 Apr 02)

2. BADGES, IDENTIFICATION, UNIFORMS, DECALS, LICENSES & VEHICLE THEFTS:

a. The following identifications and DoD decals were reported stolen or missing during this reporting period:

Identification Type	Owner or #	Location	Reference
DoD Decal	HCU697	Ft Campbell, KY	CID, Ft Campbell 0285-02
DoD Decal	KBU016	Ft Gordon, GA	CID, Ft Gordon 0157-02
DoD Decal	IPA886	Columbia, SC	CID, Ft Jackson 0155-02
Retired Military Dependant ID card	Ms Beth A. WILLS 241-72-8005	Ft Bragg, NC	CID, Ft Bragg 0487-02
Military ID card	PFC Joseph L. BOWMAN 376-92-2375	Ft Bragg, NC	CID, Ft Bragg 0486-02

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3. POTENTIAL SURVEILLANCES & INTRUSIONS:

a. Recently a woman contacted the FBI and reported that she observed four minivans parked in Mt. Nebo State Park, near Russellville, AR, while she was visiting. The minivans appeared to be identical and new. She could not remember the license plate numbers of the minivans, but did remember that one was from Pennsylvania and one from Virginia. The park is on a mountain overlooking Russellville and the surrounding area. From where the vans were parked, the occupants were afforded a view of Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), a nuclear power plant just west of Russellville. As soon as the men saw that the woman was watching them, they hurriedly left the area. The exact date of this incident is unknown, but it took place between 14 and 16 Apr 02. Another incident was reported to have occurred at ANO approximately 3 weeks earlier. During that incident, four or five middle eastern men were observed surveilling ANO from a car parked on a nearby road. When the car was approached, the men drove off before they could be questioned. In Nov or Dec 01, a flight plan map was found in Afghanistan that contained detailed flight information for Little Rock National Airport, AR, an airport in Fort Smith, AR, and flight information directly over ANO (AFOSI, Talon # 427-19-04-02-12).

b. On 13 Apr 02, four middle eastern males requested permission to videotape and photograph Six Flags Saint Louis, Eureka, MO. When they were denied entrance, they requested permission to videotape and photograph the theme park from the parking lot. They were denied permission and escorted from the park. According to the Saint Louis Joint Terrorism Task Force, similar incidents have happened at two other Six Flags theme parks (47T16, CID, Ft L. Wood, MO, 0135-02).

4. ARMS, AMMUNITION, EXPLOSIVES AND SENSITIVE ITEMS

a. On 25 April 2002, a roofing company in Las Vegas, NV, arrived at a construction site located near the interchange of Ann Road and US 95, Las Vegas, NV, and discovered a portable propane tank missing. The propane tank is a white, 250-gallon portable tank with "Vegas Propane" on the sides in red lettering. The tank was approximately 75 percent full and was used to heat tar for roofing. The propane company advised that the amount of propane remaining was approximately equivalent to four blocks of C-4 plastic explosive. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department notified local agencies of the missing trailer and is using air support and ground patrols to locate the missing tank (AFOSI Eagle Watch, 25 Apr 02).

ACIC Comment: The cost of a new 250-gallon propane tank is approximately \$750. The value of the gas left in the stolen tank is approximately \$200. A financially supported terrorist cell, such as those of the 11 Sep attackers, would easily be able to afford to purchase the tank and the gas. It is possible, however, that a cell would choose to steal such an item. It may feel it is too difficult to develop a cover story for such a purchase, since a propane distribution company would expect to deliver such an item to a home or job site.

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b. Two Chinese nationals were convicted Tuesday in Baltimore, MD, of violating arms-export laws by trying to buy secret military encryption devices from a Columbia company for shipment to China. Authorities said Eugene You-Tsai HSU, 60, of Blue Springs, MO, and David Tzu Wvi YANG, 49, of Los Angeles, CA, both naturalized US citizens, were convicted after a two-week trial by a federal jury that deliberated about seven hours. The men had contacted Mykotronx Inc., a private company with offices in Columbia, MD, last May about purchasing two devices that prevent secret information from being intercepted while being transmitted by phone, fax or computer, court documents said. Mykotronx officials contacted the US Customs Service, which then had undercover agents pose as company officials interested in selling the devices (Washington Post, 2 May 02).

c. On 29 Apr 02, CID, Ft Carson, CO, was notified that six AN/PVS-14 (Night Vision Scopes), SNs 21723, 21733, 21744, 22746, 22481 and 21870, had been lost by Federal Express Mailing Services while being shipped to ITT Industries, Night Vision Division, Roanoke, VA, on 9 Apr 02 (CID, Ft Carson, 0346-02).

d. Between 20 and 21 Apr 02, two M-16A2 rifles, SNs 3344508 and 3348171, were stolen while in transit from Incirlik, Turkey and Karshi-Kanabad, Uzbekistan (SIR 02-0020).

e. Between 1 Jun 01 and 25 Apr 02, PFC Ryan M. HEINRICH, 369-94-3234, 2/5th Cav Rgm, Ft Hood, TX, stole four rounds of 5.56mm blank ammunition, 254 rounds of 5.56mm ball ammunition, one .50 caliber round, one 25mm training round, one 40mm training round, one trip flare and five smoke grenades, all which were recovered from his residence at 3203 Ft Hood Street, Blue Bonnet Mobile Home Park, Killeen, TX (CID, Ft Hood, TX, 0524-02).

f. On 1 May 02, police recovered three flash M-117 simulator explosive booby traps, three civilian brand blasting caps, 188 Pseudoephedrine tablets, an unknown amount of suspected methamphetamines, and various other drug paraphernalia during a traffic accident investigation in Hopkinsville, KY. The persons involved in the accident were not affiliated with the military and it is unknown how they obtained the military simulators (CID, Ft Campbell, KY, 0303-02).

5. HATE CRIMES

a. On 28 Apr 02, four US soldiers were arrested by German police for an alleged "hate crime" after they were observed by police physically assaulting a Moroccan National. The four soldiers were identified as SPC Steven M. REQUENA, 415-77-8406; PFC Jason S. WALLACE, 007-82-0747; SPC Francis J. HAMILTON, 173-64-9858; and SPC Frank CARABALLO, 148-70-7913, all assigned to 101st MI Bn, Wuerzburg, GE. The soldiers claimed that they had been in a mutual affray with several other men and when the German police arrived on the scene they only saw the last part of the incident (47T17, CID Wuerzburg, GE,0075-02).

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D. CHEMICAL – BIOLOGICAL THREAT

1. **MILITARY CONTAMINATION THREATS:** There was one new anthrax related incident reported to CID during this reporting period. As of this summary, the CID had processed 342 incidents of suspected contamination threats.

2. On 20 Apr 02, a chemical irritant, identified by a Hazmat team as CW Gas, was dispersed in the women's bathroom of a nightclub frequented by USAF personnel in downtown Great Falls, MT. The irritant temporarily incapacitated several individuals at the establishment causing the need for evacuation and medical assistance. A similar incident happened in the same location two weeks earlier; however, neither police nor fire department personnel responded as altercations occur at this nightclub on a regular basis. AFOSI contacted local police and determined that there were no indications of potential targeting against US military personnel (AFOSI Talon 806-21-04-02-009; 21 Apr 02).

JFIC comment: According to local Hazmat officials, the irritant "CW Gas" was either tear gas or pepper spray. Both of these irritants attack the mucus membranes and tear ducts and are available commercially. The effects are short-term. Generally, fresh air and water flushing alleviates symptoms.

E. BOMB THREATS / GENERAL THREATS

1. On 23 Apr 02, PVT Jason O. SMITH, 427-41-7269, HSB, 3d Bn, 319th FA, Ft Bragg, NC, was identified as the person who had mailed a dead snake as a threat in a package to SFC Marvin CROMARTIE on 7 Mar 02. PVT SMITH is believed to have also mailed a package containing an unknown white powder to SFC CROMARTIE on 31 Jan 02 (CID, Ft Bragg, NC 0132-02).

2. On 1 and 2 May 02, telephonic bomb threats were received at the Child Development Centers, Ft Meade, MD. In both cases, personnel at the CDCs failed to follow bomb threat procedures, which have hampered CID investigative efforts in comparing and tracing the calls. In both cases, no bomb or incendiary device was found. Investigation continues (CID, Ft Meade, MD).

CID Comment: Force Protection, security and law enforcement officials need to stress to their installation members the importance of adhering to standard bomb threat procedures. Bomb threat procedures and check lists should be either prominently posted near telephones or readily available to employees. These procedures should be stressed with employees in facilities or activities that are considered at risk.

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F. LAW ENFORCEMENT

1. PERSPECTIVE: CID and CI Working Together: Since 11 Sep 01, the sharing of information between CID and CI has improved considerably. Although a good working relationship has always existed, the sharing of information has become a priority. An article written by CW4 Bob SIMPSON, LNO, 902d MI Gp, ACIC, is included at Attachment 1. Future articles will discuss lessons learned from both the CID and the CI perspective.

2. SUICIDE BOMBINGS: The FBI possesses no information indicating specific plans to conduct suicide bomb attacks in the United States. However, the growing frequency of such attacks in the Middle East raises the specter that similar attacks could occur in other parts of the world. FBI analysts have compiled the following information, based on characteristics of suicide bomb attacks in the Middle East (FBI Bulletin #10).

a. Religiously motivated terrorist organizations almost exclusively use males as suicide bombers. By contrast, politically motivated terrorist organizations have been known to use female bombers, as has been seen recently in attacks on Israeli targets.

b. Generally, the only identifiable characteristic when persons carry bombs on their bodies is that they wear coats or large garments in order to conceal the device. Bombers have also concealed devices in backpacks and shopping bags. Ritual or symbolic clothing is generally avoided by suicide bombers in an effort to avoid suspicion.

c. Suicide bombers are under tremendous mental pressure that often manifests itself by unusual and suspicious behavior. Such behavior could include, but not be limited to, excessive perspiration, muttering a prayer under one's breath, or darting one's eyes continuously.

d. At the time of an attack, suicide bombers are generally clean-shaven with closely cropped hair. This helps attackers fit into Western surroundings, and it also serves as a purification ceremony that Islamic terrorists undergo prior to conducting their attacks.

G. CONUS THREAT INFORMATION

1. On 9 Apr 02, three men went to the US Coast Guard (USCG) recruiting Office, in North Olmstead, OH, a suburb of Cleveland. Two of the males were citizens of Yemen. They claimed to be naturalized US citizens but had no proof. The third male was a cousin and served as an interpreter. The males inquired about joining the USCG and were given standard recruiting information. Also, they asked about security at US ports. The three men scheduled a subsequent appointment for 11 Apr 02, when a Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS) Agent interviewed them. One of the men presented a US Merchant Marine document that had expired on 19 Sep 99. He had entered the US in 1992 at Brooklyn, NY. A person with the same name

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and birth date arrived in Brooklyn, NY, from Frankfurt, Germany with \$20,800 US currency in Oct 95. The address he gave as his residence, 5051 Steadman Street, Dearborn, MI, was found to be an address related to a mail seizure of 600 grams of khat (a green leafy shrub that is chewed for its stimulant effect) shipped from Yemen. The third individual was in fact a naturalized US citizen and cousin of the above two males. He is believed to be a local Cleveland, OH, resident, though no further information was available. The local FBI office was notified and Joint Terrorist Task Force in Cleveland will conduct the follow-up investigation (IIR 4 105 0095 02).

2. A Pakistani media outlet claims Usama bin LADIN is about to carry out two acts against the US in the next four months. According to the report, members of al-Qaida plan to target diplomats, intercity bridges, military bases, airports, and radio and television stations. The Pakistani media outlet claims the World Net Daily -- a book recovered by the British police during a raid on an al-Qaida compound -- allegedly provides an outline of how to become an operative in a foreign country. The book also reveals that al-Qaida should target its recruiting to include persons working in airports and at US borders (FBIS, SAP20020425000046, 25 Apr 02).

CID Comment: Although there have been numerous reports concerning possible terrorist plots and the locations where these terrorist incidents will take place, airports remain a major concern due to recent events. Federal authorities arrested 94 airport workers at Virginia's Dulles International Airport and Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport on a variety of charges ranging from falsifying social security information, omitting information about prior criminal convictions, and violating immigration laws. Authorities also conducted a similar sweep at Baltimore-Washington International Airport that resulted in the arrest of 10 persons on similar charges. Those arrested were mostly construction workers, janitors, and food workers, though two were baggage screeners.

ACIC Comment: Operation Tarmac, the widespread investigation into airport personnel across the country, has now been conducted in 14 cities and has resulted in the arrests of about 400 workers since 11 Sep. With the exception of Ali Hamoud, mentioned in the ACIC Terrorism Summary, 23 Apr 02, there has been no direct or tangential connection established between any of those arrested and any terrorist activity or group. While the overall effectiveness of Operation Tarmac may be realized in clearing airports of illegal immigrant employees, it may yield little in terms of neutralizing the terrorist threat. Other reporting on sweeps related to Operation Tarmac can be found in the ACIC Terrorism Summaries for 27 Mar and 19 Apr 02.

3. The Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) and its director have been charged with lying about their ties to terrorists. The organization reportedly had links to Usama bin LADIN for decades and gave large amounts of cash to al-Qaida. Also, al-Qaida members allegedly have held positions within the charity, some of whom were attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Authorities arrested the head of BIF, Enaam M. Arnaouta, a 39-year old, Syrian-born, naturalized American citizen on 30 April 2002 (Multiple Open Sources, 1 May 02).

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ACIC Comment: An affidavit against BIF was issued on 29 Apr 02, which states the organization and its leader knowingly made false declarations and statements and violated US code under oath in a US court proceeding. The affidavit also provides information on BIF's links to terrorist organizations and individuals. BIF allegedly had direct dealings with representatives of Chechen mujahedin and Hizb-e-Islami. BIF made efforts to provide the Chechen mujahedin with money, an X-ray machine, and anti-mine boots. BIF has offices in Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia, China, Dagestan, Georgia, Ingushetia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen. BIF was founded in the 1980s by a wealthy Saudi named Sheik Adil Abdul Gaili BATARGY, who is an associate of Usama bin LADIN. BATARGY later transferred control of BIF to the current chief, who is the aforementioned naturalized American citizen. BIF was incorporated in Illinois as a non-profit organization in 1992. BIF's leader is also a close associate of Gulbuddin HEKMATYAR (aka "the Engineer") and the Hizb-e-Islami, an organization HEKMATYAR founded. HEKMATYAR has connections to Sheik Omar Abdel RAHMAN, the blind sheik who is now in US prison for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. BIF also allegedly has contacts to the following individuals: Mamdouh SALIM: a key bin LADIN associate who is currently in US custody; he participated in efforts to obtain nuclear and chemical weapons for al-Qaida. Mohamed BAYAZID: made efforts to obtain uranium for al-Qaida to develop a nuclear weapon. Mohamad Jamal KHALIFA: bin LADIN's brother-in-law who has been closely linked to the men accused of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. KHALIFA also planned to bomb 12 airliners over American cities in 1994, as well as assassinate Pope John Paul II. Wali Khan Amil SHAH: a key participant in the plot to bomb 12 airliners and assassinate the Pope. Furthermore, on 21 Apr 99, trash recovered by investigators from BIF's offices in Palos Hills, IL, included a copy of a Feb 99 article concerning smallpox as a biological weapon. Highlighted was text indicating that state, local, and federal authorities were poorly prepared to respond to a biological attack involving smallpox.

H. INTERNATIONAL THREAT INFORMATION

1. Colombia: Attorney General John D. ASHCROFT announced murder charges against Colombia's leading guerrilla group and six of its members in the slayings of three Americans working with an isolated Indian tribe in 1999, saying that the move demonstrates the BUSH administration's determination to prosecute terrorists outside the Muslim world. ASHCROFT said the indictments against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, are "a step toward ridding our hemisphere of the narco-terrorism that threatens our lives, our freedom and our human dignity." Both the US and Colombian government have labeled the FARC, along with a smaller leftist guerrilla group and a right-wing paramilitary group, as terrorist organizations. The administration has asked Colombia to extradite the six FARC members who were indicted yesterday, all of whom are at large. Among those charged was German Briceno SUAREZ, also known as GRANOBLES, who commands FARC forces in the eastern Colombian

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state of Arauca, where the three were killed. BRICENO'S brother, Jorge BRICENO, is the overall FARC military commander (Washington Post).

2. TUNISIA: According to press reports, the German Federal Criminal Office (BKA) has uncovered ties between a Tunisian who crashed a gas-laden truck into a synagogue on the island of Djerba, Tunisia, last week and a radical German Muslim known for his association with a suspected al-Qaida operative who has been implicated in the 11 Sept attacks on New York and Washington (Hamburg, Der Spiegel, 18 Apr 02). The Tunisian driver, identified as Nizar Ben Mohamed Nasr NAWAR, is believed to have deliberately crashed into the synagogue, killing 17 persons. On 16 Apr 02, two Arabic language newspapers, the Al Quds Al-Arabi and the Al Hayat, both published in London, were the first to publicly identify NAWAR. The papers apparently received a claim of responsibility from a group calling itself the "Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Sites," the same group that claimed responsibility for the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. An hour before the synagogue attack, German intelligence services intercepted a phone call suspected to have been made by NAWAR. During the call, NAWAR was heard asking a German associate to pray for him and remarked that he was only waiting for an order or command. This associate was Michael Christian G., originally from Poland, who had become a German citizen and converted to Islam. (In Germany, suspects who have not been convicted of crimes are normally identified in public by their first name and the initial letter of their last name). G. had already come to the attention of German authorities for his past activities, including repeated travel to Pakistan and attendance at unnamed training camps in Afghanistan. G. also had contacts with suspected al-Qaida member Mouhamedou Ould SLAHI, who fled Germany shortly after the attacks on New York and Washington. He was subsequently arrested in Mauritania, where he is currently incarcerated. The Germans considered SLAHI one of al-Qaida's key operatives in Europe, as well as in North America. He transferred funds to the terror organization through an import-export firm in Duisburg, Germany. During the trial of Ahmed RESSAM, the Algerian convicted of attempting to blow up Los Angeles International Airport, RESSAM named SLAHI as the person who ordered the attack on the airport (Open Sources).

ACIC Comment: Reportedly, German authorities are increasingly concerned that they may have uncovered part of a new al-Qaida-associated terrorist cell with at least some members based in Germany. If these suspicions are confirmed, there may be security implications for US military sites in Germany as well as North America. The Tunisian suicide driver spent time in Canada before returning to his homeland, and Algerian Ahmed RESSAM, convicted last year for a failed attempt to bomb the Los Angeles airport, lived in Montreal (Force Protection/ Information Operations Branch).

3. GEORGIA: On 30 Apr 02, US troops launched operations in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia to train local forces in anti-terrorism tactics, the latest step in the worldwide campaign against terrorism. Eighteen Americans arrived in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, the first of 150 Special Operations forces involved in the deployment. The rest are to arrive in coming weeks,

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with training to begin in May. The \$64 million training program is similar to US anti-terrorist training for forces in the Philippines. Georgia had requested help from the US in battling the insurgents. (Washington Post, 1 May 02).

4. TURKEY: Turkey has been listed as a high-priority target for terrorist attacks by agents recruited across the Middle East and trained in Iranian camps, according to diplomatic reports. The objective of the reported Iranian plan is to destabilize Turkey, Washington's key ally in the region and a country plagued by economic difficulties and guerrilla war by Kurdish separatists. The reports of plans targeting Turkey are largely based on information from Iranians applying for visas for travel to the US at the US Embassy in Cyprus. They coincide with a lengthy statement by exiled Iranian opponents, outlining an intricate recruitment and training program of potential terrorists.

5. TAJIKISTAN: The amount of Afghan heroin seized on its way to neighboring Tajikistan has soared during the month of Apr 02 to more than three times last year's levels. The Russian-led guard force that patrols the Tajik-Afghan area has confiscated 240 kilograms of drugs from traffickers during Apr 02, including 143 kilograms of heroin. Six smugglers have been killed in armed clashes with border guards this month and the guards register about ten attempts daily to smuggle contraband into Tajikistan (Moscow Times, 30 Apr 02).

6. Afghanistan: British Special Air Service (SAS) troops are waging a drug war in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the source for most of the heroin that enters Europe and Great Britain, with devastating effects on the population. Early on in the war, SAS units began conducting raids on suspected safe houses for huge stashes of heroin processed from Afghanistan's abundant poppy harvest. The country's farmers can turn out poppy virtually year-round, harvesting the crop in the spring in the south and in the fall in the cooler north. Reportedly, the SAS units have enjoyed great success in finding and destroying huge stockpiles of drugs. The search and destroy mission continue (Washington Times, 3 May 02).

7. EUROPE: In late Apr 02, the Legal Attaché, US Embassy Berlin, received information from German counterparts concerning details of upcoming terrorist attacks in Europe. According to the information received, an Afghani citizen currently residing in the US, Ahmad Tia HALMUNDI, is financing the planned attacks. The telephone number (818) 988-1962 was associated with the Afghani (AMEMBASSY Berlin, 290451Z Apr 02).

ACIC Comment: Research conducted on (818) 988-1962 yielded the following information on two associated businesses: The phone number is listed to a computer services company located in California engaged in building and selling computers and computer parts. The proprietor's last name is of middle eastern origin and is common in Lebanon. The company is a division of an Internet services corporation also located in California. The corporation has some of the same telephone numbers associated with it as the computer services company: (818) 988-1962 and (FAX) 414 818-5462, as well as a toll free number (877) 988-1962. The corporation appears to be an age verification service used by Internet users to access restricted

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pornographic Web sites. The online or mail in application form includes personal information such as complete name, address, telephone number, email address, requested site name, and desired method of payment, which includes bank check or money order. Database checks have revealed no further information concerning HALMUNDI. There is no available information establishing a direct connection between HALMUNDI and the businesses associated with the telephone number. It is conceivable that al-Qaida has developed a means to finance terrorist activities through exploitation of adult-oriented Web sites. Information collected from the associated enrollment process of Internet age verification Web site services can be used to manufacture false identities. The information can also be used to secure forms of false documentation such as fraudulent credit cards, driver's licenses and social security cards to support a fraudulent identity. Identity theft is the fastest growing crime in the US and could conceivably be used to finance terrorist activities around the globe.

I. SIGNIFICANT DATES AND EVENTS

It is noted that groups/individuals associated with Usama Bin Laden do not appear to pattern their attacks to any significant dates.

- 6 May Birthday of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
- 8 - 10 May 02 United Nations General Assembly in New York City.
- 14 May Beginning of first Arab – Israeli War.
- 15 May Palestine Day (end of UN mandate); the 15 May Organization founded in 1979 by remnant of Special Operations Group of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), takes it name from this event.
- 31 May 02 – 30 Jun 02 World Cup Soccer Tournament in Seoul, South Korea.

J. THE WAY AHEAD (FUTURE FOCUS)

1. The recent mailbox bombings by a domestic terrorist will most likely continue, or the target selection may change, if one is to believe the letters that accompanied the pipe bombs. Rock Island Arsenal is near the area where the pipe bombs were placed. The cautions issued by the USPS and referred to previously in this report should be a matter of concern for any Army members in that area of the country.
2. It is noted that there have been seemingly long periods of time between terrorist attacks in the past. The al-Qaeda group has been known to take extended periods of time to plan and execute an attack. The lack of any apparent timely follow-up to the September 11th attacks

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should not be taken as a sign that no further attacks will occur. Long term planning before an event has characterized several of the recent attacks, to include the September 11th attack.

3. With the continuation of military action in Afghanistan by the US and its allies, the build up of US ground forces in Afghanistan, and the continual removal of detainees outside the country, the threat of additional terrorist attacks against US interests worldwide continues. Terrorist have kidnapped and seized hostages in the past in order to bargain for the release of their fellow terrorists being held as prisoners by governments. The use of suicide bombings may also be expected to continue. Law enforcement and security personnel should be alert for possible precursors of kidnapping attempts, such as surveillance.

4. All suspicious activity and intelligence should be promptly reported for formal evaluation without regard to the number of overall reports previously submitted. Even a seemingly unimportant incident might be of significance when combined with other reports.

POC for this report is SA Joe Garrett, (703) 806-4902.

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ATTACHMENT 1

PERSPECTIVE: CID and CI Working Together

CW4 Robert B. Simpson
902d MI Group LNO to USACIDC

The tragic events of 11 Sep 01, brought home the urgent need for increased coordination and communication between the criminal investigative and counterintelligence assets of the US Army Criminal Investigative Command (USACIDC) and the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), respectively. While effective working relationships already existed between the two commands, the sharing of timely intelligence related to force protection and providing support to Homeland Defense activities took on new levels of importance. New initiatives and new or improved ways of doing business are now the order of the day.

Allow me to introduce myself...for I am a “product” of one of the new initiatives...CW4 Robert B. Simpson, Liaison Officer (LNO) from the 902d Military Intelligence Group (CI) to USACIDC. I am a mobilized Reserve IMA and have been TCSd by the 902d MI Group to Ft. Belvoir, VA. Here, I am co-located with the team that publishes this excellent weekly CRIMINTSIM. Similarly, USACIDC has appointed LNOs to the 902d MI Group’s Army Counterintelligence Center (ACIC) at Ft. Meade, VA, and to the Army Case Control Office (ACCO) at INSCOM, Ft. Belvoir. (Please see the “End Note” for the names and phone numbers of the current LNOs.)

Over the next several months, I will contribute regular articles to the CRIMINTSUM under the banner “PERSPECTIVE: CID and CI Working Together”. The articles will serve as a mechanism to provide insights and perspective on how CID and CI assets can work together even more effectively to achieve both independent and mutually beneficial objectives. To the extent that security classification levels permit, we will share various “war stories”, successes and learning experiences that come from working together (or not, which may happen on occasion). We’ve already discovered that there is much that CID and CI assets can learn from each other and that there are many ways to support activities of the other. With an increase awareness of what each entity is all about, we can maximize the benefits of present and future working relationships.

At times, publication space or other considerations may demand a “Burma Shave” (i.e., installment) approach to a topic, so be sure to “tune in” from week to week. In the end, we will all become better informed and aware of how CI and CID can and should work together.

Before ending this introduction to “PERSPECTIVE: CID and CI Working Together”, I want to again acknowledge that some excellent working relationships already exist between CID and CI elements, particularly where they are co-located. Frequently, the more successful interactions

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have been the direct result of individual agent personalities clicking with one another. When those personality factors no longer exist, however, coordination has sometimes fallen off a bit. We hope to get past personality-based relationships and establish a sustained, win-win relationship. It is in the best interests of both CI and CID elements to remain vigilant to each other's presence and needs. For your convenience, attached is a detachable listing of CI offices and telephone numbers. Please take it and keep it handy.

One final note...Any time you want to share a past or future successful or "challenged" relationship that you've had with CI, please do not hesitate to contact me at (703) 806-4905 or by e-mail via the NIPERNET (Global Address List – Simpson, Robert B.). I look forward to talking to you in person or through future issues of the CRIMINTSUM.

End Note: Your current CID and CI (MI) LNOs are:

USACIDC LNO to Army Case Control Office (ACCO) at INSCOM, Ft. Belvoir, VA
CW3 Leroy Shamburger (703) 806-0219

USACIDC LNO to Army Counterintelligence Center (ACIC), 902d MI Group, Ft. Meade, MD
CW2 Mauro Orcesi (301) 677-2047

902d MI Group LNO to USACIDC, Ft. Belvoir, VA
CW4 Bob Simpson (703) 806-4905



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